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INTRODUCTION 
Unanimous verdicts have long been the fascination of law-
yers and academics.  The history behind the unanimous verdict 
requirement, the benefits and detriments of such a require-
ment, and alternative methods are all vigorously debated.  A 
foray into Jewish/Talmudic law
1
 introduces a puzzling twist in 
                                                          
1 Before such a foray:  
[a] brief historical review will familiarize the new reader of Jewish law 
with its history and development. The Pentateuch (the five books of 
Moses, the Torah) is the elemental document of Jewish law and, accord-
ing to Jewish legal theory, was revealed to Moses at Mount Sinai. The 
Prophets and Writings, the other two parts of the Hebrew Bible, were 
written over the next 700 years, and the Jewish canon was closed 
around the year 200 before the Common Era (“B.C.E.”). The close of the 
canon until year 250 of the Common Era (“C.E.”) is referred to as the 
era of the Tannaim, the redactors of Jewish law, whose period closed 
with the editing of the Mishnah by Rabbi Judah the Patriarch. The 
next five centuries were the epoch in which scholars called Amoraim 
(“those who recount” Jewish law) and Savoraim (“those who ponder” 
Jewish law) wrote and edited the two Talmuds (Babylonian and Jerusa-
lem). The Babylonian Talmud is of greater legal significance than the 
Jerusalem Talmud and is a more complete work. 
The post-Talmudic era is conventionally divided into three periods: (1) 
the era of the Geonim, scholars who lived in Babylonia until the mid-
eleventh century; (2) the era of the Rishonim (the early authorities), 
who lived in North Africa, Spain, Franco-Germany, and Egypt until the 
end of the fourteenth century; and (3) the period of the Aharonim (the 
latter authorities), which encompasses all scholars of Jewish law from 
the fifteenth century up to this era. From the period of the mid-
fourteenth century until the early seventeenth century, Jewish law un-
derwent a period of codification, which led to the acceptance of the law 
code format of Rabbi Joseph Karo, called the Shulhan Arukh, as the ba-
sis for modern Jewish law. The Shulhan Arukh (and the Arba'ah Turim 
of Rabbi Jacob ben Asher, which preceded it) divided Jewish law into 
four separate areas: Orah Hayyim is devoted to daily, Sabbath, and hol-
iday laws; Even HaEzer addresses family law, including financial as-
pects; Hoshen Mishpat codifies financial law; and Yoreh Deah contains 
dietary laws as well as other miscellaneous legal matter. Many signifi-
cant scholars - themselves as important as Rabbi Karo in status and 
authority - wrote annotations to his code which made the work and its 
surrounding comments the modern touchstone of Jewish law. The most 
recent complete edition of the Shulhan Arukh (Vilna, 1896) contains no 
less than 113 separate commentaries on the text of Rabbi Karo. In ad-
dition, hundreds of other volumes of commentary have been published 
as self-standing works, a process that continues to this very day. Be-
sides the law codes and commentaries, for the last 1200 years, Jewish 
law authorities have addressed specific questions of Jewish law in writ-
ten responsa (in question and answer form). Collections of such respon-
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the unanimous verdict discussion.  The Talmud rules that a 
unanimous verdict by the Sanhedrin (Jewish court) must be 
thrown out and the defendant must be exonerated!  The alleged 
guilt of the defendant is immaterial and the killer walks away 
a free man.  Such an illogical outcome seems strikingly out of 
place within the logical Talmud.  Yet, a closer look at this law 
reveals that this quizzical result is actually quite rational.  In 
fact, understanding the logic behind this surprising law sheds 
light on numerous aspects of modern legal theory.  Part I of 
this paper will provide background information regarding the 
current academic discussion surrounding the unanimous ver-
dict.  Part II will discuss the startling Talmudic passage on the 
unanimous verdict.  It will additionally focus on one explana-
tion that radically reinterprets this passage.  Part IIIA will in-
troduce two schools of thought on the rationale behind the anti-
unanimity rule.  Part IIIB will highlight two areas of modern 
legal theory affected by such rationales.  
I. THE UNANIMOUS VERDICT IN AMERICAN LAW 
A. History of Unanimity 
One of the earliest recorded unanimous jury verdicts was 
in Europe in the year 1367.
2
  By the eighteenth century, unan-
imous verdicts were “an accepted feature of the common-law 
jury.”
3
  Today, under American law, unanimous jury verdicts 
are required in federal felony trials
4
 and in many state trials as 
well.
5
  In 1972, in Apodaca v. Oregon, the United States Supreme 
Court posited four possible theories for the unanimity require-
                                                                                                                                  
sa have been published, providing guidance not only to later authorities 
but also to the community at large. Finally, since the establishment of 
the State of Israel in 1948, the rabbinical courts of Israel have pub-
lished their written opinions deciding cases on a variety of matters. 
Michael J. Broyde, The Foundations of Law: A Jewish Law View of World 
Law, 54 Emory L.J. 79, 80 n.3 (2005). 
2 Jeremy Osher, Note, Jury Unanimity in California: Should It Stay or 
Should It Go?, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1319, 1326 (1996). 
3 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1972). 
4 FED.. R. CRIM. P. 31(a). 
5 See Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, and the 
Protection of the Holdout Juror, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 615 (2007); see 
also Emil J. Bove III, Preserving the Value of Unanimous Criminal Jury Ver-
dicts in Anti-Deadlock Instructions, 97 GEO. L.J.251 (2008). 
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ment.
6
  The first theory was that the rule was “designed to 
compensate for lack of procedural safeguards ensuring that the 
defendant received a fair trial.”
7
  The second theory was that 
the rule “developed from the practice of afforcement of the jury 
which was firmly established by the late 14th century.”
8
  This 
simply “meant that a sufficient number were to be added to the 
panel until 12 were at last found to agree in the same conclu-
sion.”
9
  A third possibility was that “unanimity developed be-
cause early juries, unlike juries today, personally had 
knowledge of the facts of a case; the medieval mind assumed 
there could be only one correct view of the facts, and, if either 
all the jurors or only a minority thereof declared the facts erro-
neously, they might be punished for perjury.”
10
  Lastly, “una-
nimity may have arisen out of the medieval concept of consent 
which carried with it the idea of unanimity.”
11
 
Regardless of the exact reason behind the rise of the unan-
imous jury verdict system, “the unanimous jury has been so 
embedded in our legal history that no one would question its 
constitutional position.”
12
  Unanimous conviction of the accused 
has largely remained “sacred and inviolate.”
13
 
B. Benefits of Unanimity 
Supporters of the unanimous verdict often extol the many 
benefits of such a system.  First, requiring every juror to agree 
on the verdict ensures that the minority opinion is heard, dis-
cussed, and analyzed until the entire group is adequately con-
vinced of its flaws.
14
 
 Second, unanimous verdicts protect the integrity of our 
                                                          
6 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2. 
7 Osher, supra note 2, at 1326 n.37 (citing Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2).  
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. (quoting Apocada, 406 U.S. at 408). 
11 Id. (citing Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2). 
12 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 382 n.1 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).  
13 Osher, supra note 2, at 1339 (quoting Bill Boyarsky, Balky Trial Could 
Ignite Move to Radically Alter Jury System, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at 
A18). 
14 Jere Morehead, A “Modest” Proposal for Jury Reform: The Elimination 
of Required Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 46 KAN. L. REV. 933, 943 (1998). 
320 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  3::10 
legal system as they “represent the rational and reasoned 
judgment of all twelve jurors.”
15
  When all of the jurors agree 
on an outcome, the public feels that the jurors “fully deliberat-
ed the case and that the resulting verdict is just.”
16
  The rule 
removes the misconception that the “the government . . .  
abuse[s] its power and wrongly convict[s] people who aren’t 
guilty.”
17
 
Lastly, proponents of the unanimous verdict requirement 
often cite the system’s impressive history when discussing its 
virtues.
18
  The fact that the unanimous verdict is required by 
judiciaries in many countries and states surely points to its ef-
ficacy as well. 
C. Detriments of Unanimity 
Although many discuss the numerous benefits of the una-
nimity requirement, some have criticized this rule.  Arguing 
that “historical inertia should not prevent change,” these schol-
ars have called for the abolishment of unanimity.
19
  Ironically, 
England, the source of America’s unanimous verdict rule, no 
longer requires such unanimity.
20
  Moreover, some critics note 
that the unanimous jury requirement may be nothing more 
than a historical accident.
21
  Critics of the unanimous jury 
point to the large number of hung juries caused by such a re-
quirement.
22
    Additionally, hung juries are costly, inefficient, 
and they cause a backlog in the court docket.
23
  Removing una-
nimity requirements would allow courts to preserve a large 
                                                          
15 Osher, supra note 2, at 1363. 
16 Id.; see Kim Taylor-Thompson, Majority Rule on Juries Would Increase 
Errors, S.F. CHRON.., June 5, 1995, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/1995 
-06-05/opinion/17809061_1_jury-splits-majority-rule-unanimity.  
17 Osher, supra note 2, at 1363 (quoting Steve Wilson, Hung Juries Pref-
erable to Those that Make Wrong Decision, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 27, 1995, at 
A2). 
18 Id. at 1340.  
19 Id. 
20 Bill Boyarsky, Unanimous Verdicts Also On Trial, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 
1995, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1995-07-19/news/mn25660_1_ 
simpson-trial. 
21 State v. Gann, 463 P.2d 570, 573 (Or. 1969). 
22 Osher, supra note 2. 
23 Id. 
2013] THE UNANIMOUS VERDICT 321 
amount of wasted resources. 
Lastly, critics of unanimity highlight the concern that 
unanimous verdicts often lead to compromise convictions.
24
  As 
jurors endeavor to decide the case, a stubborn juror can seri-
ously delay reaching the verdict by holding out.  Holding out 
often causes the other jurors to make some sort of compromise, 
perhaps lessening the conviction to a lower charge, in exchange 
for the holdout juror’s guilty vote.
25
  Such a compromise is 
viewed negatively by society as it does not represent an honest 
view of the facts and legal issues involved.  Rather, it is a cheap 
bargain between disinterested parties.
26
 
D. Observation about Unanimity Scholarship  
Having discussed the pros and cons of requiring unani-
mous jury verdicts, one can offer an interesting observation.  
While critics have offered multiple reasons unanimity should 
not be required in jury verdicts, no critic has suggested that 
once a verdict is unanimous it should be disallowed, with the 
result of an acquittal.  Since hung juries and compromise con-
victions may only be caused by requiring unanimity, presuma-
bly critics are in agreement that unanimity per se is not nega-
tive.  
II. UNANIMOUS VERDICT IN TALMUDIC LAW 
A. Talmudic Passage 
In the midst of Tractate Sanhedrin,
27
 the Talmudic section 
discussing the Jewish court system, an interesting law is stat-
ed:  
                                                          
24 See generally, JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM 
AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 179 (1994). 
25 See id. 
26 Id.; see also Osher, supra note 2, at 1354. 
27 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Sanhedrin 17a. All citations and author 
translations of the Babylonian Talmud in this paper will be from the Berman 
edition of the Vilna printing (1995), which will be cited as ‘BABYLONIAN 
TALMUD,’ followed by name of tractate, and page number. Citations and au-
thor translations of Talmudic commentaries, all of which are on file with the 
author, will be cited in the following manner: Author, Title of Work, Subtitle 
[if applicable] [,] Part or Page [,] (Edition, Year). 
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R[abbi] Kahana said: If the Sanhedrin [Jewish court] unanimous-
ly find [the accused] guilty, he is acquitted. Why? — Because we 
have learned by tradition that sentence must be postponed till 
the morrow in hope of finding new points in favor of the defense.  
But this cannot be anticipated in this case.28 
The Talmud rules that a defendant who is unanimously found 
guilty may walk away free!
29
  “Where the evidence of guilt ap-
pears indisputable, Jewish law frees the suspect.”
30
  Yet, a case 
with weaker evidence, and thus containing a split amongst the 
justices, results in a conviction.  Academics have noted this ir-
rational outcome, declaring that this “paradox is quite compel-
ling.”
31
 
While the Talmud does offer some rationale for this confus-
ing law, it is still difficult to understand.  The Talmud explains 
that because the judges unanimously voted guilty, no new mer-
its will be found to help the defendant.  As such, the verdict is 
thrown out.  Yet, such an explanation is troubling at best. 
While merits and defense arguments are important, perhaps 
none exist in the present case.  Why is the defendant acquitted 
“on the basis of an apparent technicality?”
32
 
                                                          
28 Id.  
29 Id. Importantly, there is a dispute amongst Talmudic commentators 
concerning the application of this rule. Some feel that this anti-unanimity 
rule is limited to the highest appellate court, the Great Sanhedrin of 71 judg-
es. See Meir Simcha of Dvinsk, Ohr Sameach,  Laws of Sanhedrin 9:1 (War-
saw ed. 1926) (positing that Maimonides limits the anti-unanimity rule to the 
Great Sanhedrin to highlight that the defendant is completely exonerated, as 
opposed to a lower Sanhedrin, where it would simply be appealed). But see 
David Ibn Zimra, RaDBaZ, Laws of Sanhedrin 9:1 (Wagshal ed. 1984) (apply-
ing this law even to trial courts of 23 judges); see Meir Dan Plotsky, Kli 
Chemdah, Devarim 4 (Pietrikow ed., 1927); see Avraham Duber Cahana 
Shapiro, Dvar Avraham, Book 2 Ch. 34:3-4 (Warsaw ed., 1906).  For the sake 
of the comparison to the modern jury, this article accepts the latter opinion. 
30 Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Guilt: Henry Friendly 
Meets the MaHaRaL of Prague, 90 MICH. L. REV. 604, 619 (1991). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. Although this author has not found any commentator who explicit-
ly understands the Talmudic passage this way, an argument can be made 
that the unanimity law is an example of formalism. While potentially illogi-
cal, it is simply a product of procedure and thus fits into the rubric of formal-
ism. A fuller explanation of formalism is outside the scope of this article.  
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B. A Radical Reaction to this Puzzling Law 
The brilliant Talmudic commentators are understandably 
troubled by this puzzling anti-unanimity law.
33
  Accordingly, 
one Talmudic commentator radically reinterprets this passage 
by reviewing the simple meaning of the text.  The Aramaic 
word use in this Talmudic passage is “potrin,” literally under-
stood to mean “exonerated.”  However, Meir Halevi Abulafia 
(RaMah), a medieval scholar, offers a different translation.
34
  
Noting that the word potrin is also sporadically used in Tal-
mudic literature to mean “sent away,” the RaMah explains the 
Talmud in the following rational way: “If the Sanhedrin [Jew-
ish court] unanimously find [the accused] guilty, he is ‘sent 
away,’ - killed immediately.”35  Since a unanimous verdict 
shows that the defendant is definitely guilty, there is no need 
to delay the defendant’s execution.  In other words, the RaMah 
understands the Talmud as a proponent of unanimous verdicts, 
not as an opponent to them.  Avoiding any irrational interpre-
tation, the RaMah conveniently regards our passage as a clas-
sical law supporting unanimous verdicts.  Such an opinion fits 
nicely with modern American law.36 
III. FINDING RATIONALITY IN IRRATIONALITY 
Notwithstanding the RaMah’s novel reinterpretation, the 
Talmud has surprisingly acquitted a unanimously convicted de-
fendant.  Can rationality be found within this troubling law?  
Two alternative approaches emerge among the great Talmudic 
commentators in understanding our passage.  Through their 
                                                          
33 Although the term “anti-unanimity law” is imprecise, as it suggests 
that the Talmud did not allow unanimous verdicts at all, I use this term as 
shorthand for this puzzling Talmudic law only as to not break the flow of this 
article.   
34 See Meir Halevi Abulafia, Yad RaMah, Sanhedrin 17a (Shaulniki ed., 
1798); see also Asher ben Yechiel, Sanhedrin 17a (Berman ed., 1995) (quoting 
this explanation in the name of the RaMah); Reuven Margolis, Margalios 
HaYam, Sanhedrin 17a (Mossad HaRav Kook ed., 1996). But see Ha’aros, On 
Yad RaMah (Mossad HaRav Kook ed., 1996) (arguing with this interpretation 
of the Yad RaMah). 
35 Abulafia, Sanhedrin 17a (Shaulniki ed., 1798); see also Baruch Halevi 
Epstein, Torah Temimah, Mishpatim 23:2 (Romm ed., 1904) (bringing multi-
ple examples of this usage throughout Talmudic literature).  
36 See supra text accompanying notes 14-20. 
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creative explanations, these commentators shed a great deal of 
light on modern legal thought and provide insight into certain 
tenets of the Jewish justice system.  Part IIIA will list two very 
different approaches to finding rationality within the literal in-
terpretation of this law.  Part IIIB will then highlight some in-
sights into modern legal philosophy resulting from each of 
these two interpretations.  
A. Two Distinct Approaches 
1. Judicial Collusion  
 a. Explanation of Zvi Hirsh Chajes 
Although surprisingly bold, nineteenth century scholar Zvi 
Hirsh Chajes gives an easily understood answer.37  While 
unanimous verdicts can be strong indicators of the defendant’s 
guilt, Chajes takes the opposite approach.  Connecting our law 
to the next few lines of the text of Talmud, Chajes notes that a 
judge on the Sanhedrin must be a brilliant thinker.  In fact, the 
Talmud elaborates that before gaining entry onto the bench, a 
Sanhedrin judge must show that he is capable of providing a 
cogent, logical argument for an impossible factual scenario.38  
The judge must prove that a certain dead animal, ritually im-
pure according to the explicit text of the Bible, is actually ritu-
ally pure according to Jewish law.  Chajes proves from here 
that the responsibility of the Sanhedrin is to make the impos-
sible argument.39  Noting the juxtaposition of these two Tal-
mudic statements, Chajes explains that when a Sanhedrin 
unanimously convicts a defendant, collusion must be suspected.  
Since a verdict is reached without any dissenting opinion, the 
judges on the Sanhedrin are not doing their job properly, as 
                                                          
37 Zvi Hirsh Chajes, MaHaratz Chiyus, Sanhedrin 17a (Berman ed., 
1995). 
38 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Sanhedrin 17a.  
39 Chajes further bolsters this understanding by comparing the Sanhed-
rin to the modern court systems in France and Britain. Chajes, supra note 37. 
In these modern adversarial legal systems, a lawyer represents each side and 
arguments are made in favor of one’s client, no matter how implausible. The 
goal is to protect and defend ones client to the fullest. So too, the Sanhedrin 
must analyze the facts and relevant laws to provide two sides of every story. 
Id. 
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they are not making the impossible arguments.  As such, the 
Sanhedrin’s unanimity is suspect and the verdict is dis-
missed.40 
b. Explanation of Judah Loew 
Judah Loew, a 16th century scholar, likewise interprets 
this Talmudic law within the context of a fear of judicial collu-
sion.  Loew goes even further than Chajes, providing a deeper 
rationale for the acquittal.  According to Loew, the function of 
the Sanhedrin is to search for “evidence of innocence rather 
than guilt.”41  In other words, they “should not be so concerned 
about punishing those who have committed a wrong.  The court 
should . . .  stick to its business of finding merit in the defend-
ant’s cause.”42  While in some cases, evidence pointing to the 
defendant’s guilt is so strong that, that the defendant must be 
found guilty, such a verdict “is simply incidental,” or “so as not 
to pervert justice.”43  Thus, a Sanhedrin that unanimously 
finds the defendant guilty and has not properly entertained the 
possibility of his innocence is “simply not acting as a court.”44 
This idea of upholding the character of the court system 
explains a concern remaining even after Chajes and Loew’s ex-
planations.  Collusion may be a real concern in a unanimous 
verdict.  Still, the chance that exoneration may cause a guilty 
party to walk away unpunished is equally disturbing.  Howev-
er, Loew subtly addresses this concern, responding that: 
[P]reserving the court’s role as a righteous court that seeks to 
free the innocent is more important than the incidental fact of 
                                                          
40 Id.; see also YECHIEL MICHEL EPSTEIN, ARUCH HASHULCHAN [THE TABLE 
IS SET] 18:7 (Simcha Fishbane ed., 1992). As an aside, it is not surprising that 
Chajes offers this explanation.  Although not necessarily disparaging every 
Sanhedrin, this approach does take the daring step of entertaining that the 
great Sanhedrin had the potential for collusion and dishonesty. This intellec-
tually honest position fits well with Chajes, called by modern scholars a 
“Traditionalist and Maskil.” See Bruria Hutner David, The Dual Role of Rab-
bi Zvi Hirsch Chajes: Traditionalist and Maskil (1971) (unpublished Ph.D 
dissertation, Columbia University), available at http://www1.cs.columbia.edu 
/~spotter/david-chajes.pdf.  
41 Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 619 n.88. 
42 Id. at 621. 
43 Id. at 619. 
44 Id. at 621; see also NORMAN LAMM, HAGADDA: THE ROYAL TABLE 104 
(Joel B. Wolowelsky ed., 2010).  
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the defendant’s factual guilt.  That we sometimes free guilty peo-
ple is not significant.  What is critical is preserving the character 
of the court.
45
   
Loew’s weighing of judicial priorities, perhaps not “unanimous” 
amongst legal authorities, at least further brings rationality to 
this complex law.   
2. Punishment as Spiritual Cleansing 
An alternative way to approach this strange Talmudic ac-
quittal is by looking at the reasons behind punishment.  While 
legal scholars, and thus consequently American jurisdictions, 
differ about the exact purpose of punishment, two main ideas 
are often discussed.46  One position opines a utilitarian outlook, 
focusing on the general deterrence that results from punish-
ment and viewing punishment in terms of the greater good of 
society.47  A second position believes in retributive justice, that 
it is morally acceptable to bestow benefit on the aggrieved par-
ty by punishment of the wrongdoer.48   
Jewish law is the subject of a similar debate.49  Yet, an ad-
ditional dimension, perhaps a subdivision of utilitarianism, is 
frequently involved.  Many Talmudic commentators view pun-
ishment as a means to “cleanse” the defendant of his sins, ena-
bling him to continue striving for moral perfection.50  With this 
understanding of punishment as a means to forgiveness, the 
anti-unanimity requirement can be explained, albeit in two dif-
ferent ways.  
                                                          
45 Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 622. Contra Epstein, supra 
note 34 (harshly dismissing this explanation). 
46 See Erik Luna, The Practice of Restorative Justice: Punishment Theory, 
Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. 
REV. 205 (2003); see also CYNDI BANKS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 149 (2008). 
47 See Luna, supra note 46, at 208-17. 
48 See generally Adam Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009). 
49 See Meir Simcha of Dvinsk, Ohr Sameach, Laws of Murderers 6:12 
(Warsaw ed., 1926); see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Makkos 2a & 9a; 
Yom Tov Asevilli, Ritva, Makkos 9a (Wagshal ed., 1987); Birchas Avraham, 
Tractate Makkos 2a & 9a (Jerusalem ed., 1993).  
50 See Meir Simcha of Dvinsk, supra note 49.  
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a. Explanation of Menachem Mendel Schneerson 
Analogizing to another remarkable Talmudic law, Men-
achem Mendel Schneerson (d. 1994) clarifies our anti-
unanimity law.51  The Talmud states that two conspiring wit-
nesses receive the same punishment that they were trying to 
wrongly impose on a suspect if two other witnesses testify that 
the conspiring witnesses are lying.52  The two other witnesses 
know that the conspiring witnesses are lying because the con-
spiring witnesses were together with these other two witnesses 
at the time the crime occurred, and therefore the conspiring 
witnesses could not have witnessed the alleged crime.  Accord-
ing to many commentators, however, the conspiring witnesses 
are not punished if the suspect that they were trying to frame 
was already punished.53  Although conspiring witnesses are 
normally punished if they are caught before punishment is car-
ried out on the framed individual, if they perform a worse evil 
by actually causing the framed defendant’s punishment, they 
are exonerated!  Yosef Karo, a 16th century scholar, provides 
rationale for this weird dichotomy based on his opinion of the 
purpose of punishment.54  Since punishment is meant to help 
cleanse a defendant’s soul, a defendant whose crimes are ex-
ceptionally egregious (i.e., cause an innocent individual to ac-
tually be punished) does not deserve to be punished.  Rather, 
he must walk free, leaving his punishment in the hands of the 
Lord – a surely worse fate.  Likewise, explains Schneerson, a 
defendant unanimously convicted is undeserving of punish-
ment by the hands of mere mortals.55  Instead, this heinous 
criminal must be judged by the Master Judge, the Lord him-
self.  Thus, this perplexing Talmudic statement is actually 
quite rational.  
                                                          
51 See Chaya Shuchat, Unanimous Verdict, MEANINGFUL LIFE CENTER, 
http://www.meaningfullife.com/torah/parsha/devarim/shoftim/Unanimous_Ve
rdict.php#_edn10 (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).     
52 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Makkos 2b. 
53 In Aramaic this phenomenon is called “Ka’asher Zamam, v’Lo Ka’asher 
Asa.” See Shlomo Yitzhaki, Rashi, Makkos 2b (Berman ed., 1995); cf. Tosfos, 
Makkos 2b (Berman ed., 1995). 
54 See Yosef Karo, Kesef Mishnah, Laws of Testimony 20:2 (Wagshal ed., 
1984).  
55 Shuchat, supra note 51. 
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b. Explanation of Menachem Mendel Morgenstern  
Menachem Mendel Morgenstern (“Kotzker Rebbe”) also 
understands this unanimity problem based on the idea of pun-
ishment as a mode of forgiveness and spiritual cleansing, albeit 
from a different angle.56  While Morgenstern agrees with 
Schneerson that the point of punishment is to cleanse a de-
fendant’s soul, Morgenstern differs on how this cleansing oc-
curs.  He posits that the point of Sanhedrin is to help a person 
come to the internal realization that he committed a wrong and 
to truly regret his actions.57  Usually, punishment is the ideal 
method to bring about this realization.  However, when San-
hedrin unanimously convicts a defendant of egregious behav-
ior, punishment is unnecessary.  When the defendant sees that 
all the judges find him guilty, without even one judge finding 
merit in his actions, he will surely regret his actions, thus ob-
viating the need for punishment.  Although perhaps overly fa-
vorable in his assessment of the inherent goodness of human 
behavior,58 Morgenstern’s explanation of our law is clearly ra-
tional.  
B. Application to Modern Legal Theory 
While there is intense scholarly debate about whether Jew-
ish law can be compared to the modern legal system,
59
 many 
articles and studies have been written detailing the similarities 
and contrasts of the two systems.
60
  Thus, once the logic behind 
                                                          
56 Menachem Mendel Morgenstern, Emes Mikotzk Titzmach 62 (Netzach 
ed., 1961). 
57 Id. 
58 See generally JOSEPH FOX, RABBI MENACHEM MENDEL OF KOTZK: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL STUDY OF THE CHASIDIC MASTER (1988), available at 
http://itethics.tripod.com/kotzk.pdf. Ironically, Morgenstern is known for his 
sharp-witted sayings and for his impatience for false piety. His interpretation 
of this Talmudic passage seems to be contrary of this outlook. Id. 
59 See Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text; The Turn to the 
Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 813 (1993). 
60 See id.; Chad Baruch, A Critique of Reliance Upon Jewish Law to Sup-
port Capital Punishment in the United States, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 41, 
42 n.8 (2000) (quoting e.g., Steven Friedell, The “Different Voice” in Jewish 
Law: Some Parallels to a Feminist Jurisprudence, 67 IND. L. J. 915 (1992)); 
BERNARD MEISLIN, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS IN AMERICAN LAW, IN JEWISH LAW 
AND CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 109 (Nahum Rakover, ed. 1984); Perry Dane, 
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a non-unanimous verdict requirement has been established, 
the law’s relevance to modern legal theory can be analyzed.  A 
closer look at the two divergent approaches explaining the ra-
tionality in the Talmud’s anti-unanimity law reveals that cer-
tain well known ideas from the works of two popular legal the-
orists are intertwined in this Talmudic passage.  
1. Max Weber 
 a. Four Types of Legal Systems 
A very influential sociologist of the late nineteenth centu-
ry, Max Weber had a profound impact on legal theory through 
his studies of the history of economics and its complex relation-
ship to legal development.
61
  In Economics and Society, Weber’s 
groundbreaking book on this subject, he details at length “how 
legal forms are shaped by economic and social forces and vice 
versa.”
62
  In doing so, Weber outlines a basic “typology of law 
based on different modes of legal thought,” providing a vivid 
picture of the evolution of the law over time.
63
 
                                                                                                                                  
Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987); 
John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 237 (1987); Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of 
the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65 (1987); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra 
note 30; Suzanne L. Stone, Siniatic and Noahide Law: Legal Pluralism in 
Jewish Law, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1157 (1991); Thomas L. Shaffer, Jurispru-
dence in the Light of the Hebraic Faith, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 77 (1984); Bernard J. Meislin, Jewish Law in American Tribunals, 7 
ISRAELI L. REV. 349 (1972); Dena S. Davis, Method in Jewish Bioethics: An 
Overview, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 325 (1994); Joshua Fruchter, Doctors on Trial: A 
Comparison of American and Jewish Legal Approaches to Medical Malprac-
tice, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 453 (1993); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Ros-
enberg, “Perhaps What Ye Say Is Based Only on Conjecture”-Circumstantial 
Evidence, Then and Now, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1371 (1995); Gordon J. Beggs, 
Proverbial Practice: Legal Ethics from Old Testament Wisdom, 30 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 831 (1995); Shael Herman, The “Equity of the Statute” and 
Ratio Scripta: Legislative Interpretation Among Legislative Agnostics and 
True Believers, 69 TUL. L. REV. 535 (1994); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. 
Rosenberg, Advice from Hillel and Shammai on How to Read Cases: Of Speci-
ficity, Retroactivity and New Rules, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 581 (1994). 
61 SHARYN L. ROACH ANLEU, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 20-27 (2000), avail-
able at http://books.google.com/books/about/Law_and_Social_Change.html? 
id=5Xk96podfLkC. 
62 Id. at 22. 
63 Id. at 23. 
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Weber’s typology consists of four different categories of the 
law, each one leading into the next, resulting in a modern, for-
mal and rational legal system.
64
  The first category, which We-
ber calls “formal irrationality,” is when judges “apply means 
that are beyond the control of reason.”
65
  The paradigm of “for-
mal irrationality” is law based on prophecy or on an oracle.
66
 
Although this system relies on a formal, structured lawmaking 
body (i.e., prophet), its primitiveness is highlighted by the lack 
of logic inherent to any law.   
The second category, “substantive irrationality,” is when 
“decisions are influenced by concrete factors of the particular 
case evaluated in terms of ethical, emotional, or political values 
rather than general norms.”
67
  Weber cites to the Kadi, the 
Middle Eastern Islamic judge, as the prototype “substantive ir-
rationality” lawmaker.
68
  As the Kadi shied away from general 
rules, instead focusing on “particular merits of individual case,” 
many decisions were based on emotional or political considera-
tions.
69
 
Weber’s third category, called “substantive rationality,” 
has best been described as a system “where legal decisions are 
made in reference to rules that reflect value commitments or 
ethical imperatives, for example a set of codified religious rules 
or a political ideology.”
70
  Some have classified the Talmud as 
an example of “substantive rationality,” as the Talmud con-
tains numerous laws stemming from a certain moral and ethi-
cal requirement.
71
 
The most sophisticated legal system of “formal rationality,” 
Weber’s fourth category, consists of universally applied rules, 
laws and regulations.
72
  This system is as “an orientation to the 
world which expresses itself by imposing order on reality in 
                                                          
64 Nancy L. Schwartz, Max Weber’s Philosophy, 93 YALE L.J. 1386, 1387-
88 (1984) (book review). 
65 ANLEU, supra note 61, at 23. 
66 Id. at 24. 
67 Id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1388. 
68 ANLEU, supra note 61. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 See Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1395. 
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strict numerical, calculable terms.”
73
  Weber viewed contempo-
rary Western law as the paradigm of this system.
74
 
b. Sanhedrin, Substantive Rationality and the Inquisitorial 
System 
The Sanhedrin, in many ways, operated as a typical “sub-
stantive rationality” system.  One important characteristic of 
the Sanhedrin in which this is highlighted is its “inquisitorial” 
nature.
75
  In the familiar, adversarial court system in America, 
the lawyers have the responsibility of establishing and clarify-
ing the facts.  By contrast, the role of a judge of the Sanhedrin 
was to be a “fact finder” as well as a judge.  This added respon-
sibility, common in many European countries today, is em-
blematic of a “substantive rationality” system.
76
  As judges 
have greater scope for intervention, the inquisitorial system 
truly illuminates how “value commitments or ethical impera-
tives” can play a major role in decisions.
77
 
c. Sanhedrin, Substantive Rationality and Legal Guilt  
Substantive rationality is also found in the Sanhedrin by 
examining the concept of legal guilt.  Legal scholars distinguish 
between two types of guilt: factual guilt and legal guilt.
78
  Fac-
tual guilt is whether or not someone actually committed a 
crime.  Legal guilt is whether or not enough evidence is provid-
ed to prove that someone actually committed the crime.
79
  An 
important goal of a legal system built around legal guilt is to 
ensure that innocent people are never wrongly convicted of a 
crime, even if that means some more guilty people go free as a 
                                                          
73 KENNETH L. MORRISON, MARX, DURKHEIM, WEBER: FORMATIONS OF 
MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT 356 (2006), available at http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=sya6fxO6zgC&q=357#v=onepage&q=strict%20numerical&f=false. 
74 ANLEU, supra note 62, at 26. 
75 See Accusatory and Inquisitional Procedure, JEWISHENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/725-accusatory-and-inquisitorial-
procedure (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
76 ANLEU, supra note 61, at 24. 
77 Id. 
78 See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1658 (2010). 
79 Id. at 1657. 
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consequence.
80
 
Loew’s statement about the Sanhedrin’s goal to “free the 
innocent” being “more important than the incidental fact of the 
defendant’s factual guilt” speaks to the essence of legal guilt.
81
  
According to Loew, an acquittal for a unanimous verdict due to 
potential collusion is necessary to ensure the integrity of the 
judicial system.
82
  Public confidence in the judicial system is 
such an important ideal that a defendant who is likely guilty 
can walk free because of it: a key tenet of a legal guilt system.  
Thus, the Sanhedrin seemingly gave more weight to legal guilt 
than factual guilt.  
Viewing the Sanhedrin in the legal guilt context fits very 
nicely with the Sanhedrin’s “substantive rationality” compo-
nent.  Preserving the character of the court at the expense of 
not finding the defendant guilty of a crime that he likely com-
mitted typifies the “substantive rationality” idea of a “reference 
to a substantive goal” instead of an “application of abstract 
rules.”
83
  Requiring a dissenting opinion to ensure the credibil-
ity of the legal system at large imposes an extraneous ethical 
imperative not found in abstract rules.  As such, Loew’s expla-
nation of this Talmudic passage is another sign of the “sub-
stantive rationality” inherent in the Sanhedrin. 
d. Formal Rationality and the Non-unanimous Verdict 
The theme of “substantive rationality” of the Sanhedrin is 
what makes the unanimity law so striking.  A unanimity re-
quirement for verdicts generally indicates “substantive ration-
ality,” as unanimity signifies “a collective subjective response 
to the facts as presented.”
84
  This “collective subjective re-
sponse” stems from jurors’ personal feelings or value judg-
                                                          
80 See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 
48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 149 (2011). 
81 See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 30. 
82 See id. 
83 ANLEU, supra note 61, at 23-24; see also Barry C. Feld, The Right to 
Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and 
the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1227 n.164 
(1989).  
84 ANLEU, supra note 61, at 26. 
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ments, rather than any formal decision making process.
85
  For 
this reason, Weber viewed “substantive rationality” as more 
primitive than “formal rationality,” the beacon of the modern 
legal system.
86
 
Quite possibly, the anti-unanimity Talmudic law is meant 
to combat this primitiveness.  Chajes understood the anti-
unanimity rule as protecting against judicial collusion, or per-
haps, against this “collective subjective response.”  By requir-
ing the judges to provide at least one argument in defense of 
the accused, the Talmud was advocating for a more formal sys-
tem of decision-making, unhindered by pure emotion.
87
  To use 
Weber’s terminology, the anti-unanimity requirement was thus 
an injection of “formal rationality” into a highly “substantive 
rationality” system. 
2. Ronald Dworkin 
a. Judicial Discretion 
Ronald Dworkin, an influential modern legal philosopher, 
has written extensively on the role of judges as legal decision 
makers.
88
  In Dworkin’s manifesto, Taking Rights Seriously, he 
discusses the interplay between the arbiter and the preserva-
tion of certain fundamental rights for the defendant.
89
  
Dworkin argues that “claims of right” should “trump” utilitari-
an arguments in matters of morality and politics.  Cast as ar-
guments of principle, in law, they cannot be defeated by argu-
ments of social policy.
90
  As such, Dworkin views a judge’s role 
                                                          
85 Id. at 27. 
86 Id.at 26. 
87 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Sanhedrin 17a. Chajes himself al-
ludes to this phenomenon. Chajes, supra note 37. By comparing the Sanhed-
rin and its inquisitorial system to the modern public defenders of the French 
and British adversarial legal systems, Chajes shows how the anti-unanimity 
requirement bridges the gap between the two systems. Both systems are 
more focused on “formal rationality,” preferring that decisions are free of sub-
jective, moral imperatives. While the adversarial system employs the public 
defender to prevent against the “collective subjective response,” the Sanhed-
rin utilizes the anti-unanimity requirement to ensure the same outcome. Id.  
88 See Rolf Sartorius, Dworkin on Rights and Utilitarianism, 1981 UTAH 
L. REV. 263, 263 (1981). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 264; see Paul Yowell, A Critical Examination of Dworkin’s Theo-
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in assigning fault and punishment to the accused individual as 
an end unto itself, and not as a means to a larger social end.
91
  
Punishment is not to be used solely as a means of protection for 
society.
92
 
b. Dworkin and the Chassidic Outlook on Punishment 
Dworkin’s view of punishment as an “end[]” and not as a 
“means” is reflective of the aforementioned approach of pun-
ishment as a spiritual cleanser.  To interpret the startling anti-
unanimity Talmudic law, Schneerson explains that this egre-
gious defendant is undeserving of spiritual purification and is 
therefore freed.
93
  Morgenstern goes to the opposite extreme, 
understanding that in a case of such egregious misconduct pun-
ishment is unnecessary, as this defendant will surely repent 
when he hears of his unanimous conviction.
94
 
Yet, both interpretations are not bothered by the fact that 
a horrible murderer may be let loose, as protection of society is 
not a consideration when delivering punishment.  Once the 
“ends” of punishment are received by the defendant, any goal of 
punishment as a “means” to protect society is meaningless.  
Dworkin’s idea of utilitarian considerations being “trumped” by 
an individual right is the lesson of our startling anti-unanimity 
passage. 
c. Puzzling Scenario as Proof to Dworkin 
Further introspection into the perplexing Talmudic pas-
sage reveals a certain bizarre legal scenario.
95
  Envision that 
twenty-two out of the twenty-three justices on the Sanhedrin 
have just voted that a defendant is guilty of murder.  However, 
the twenty-third, and final, justice believes that the accused is 
innocent.  How should this last justice vote?  If he votes guilty, 
                                                                                                                                  
ry of Rights, 52 AM. J. JURIS 93, 95 (2007). 
91 STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 65 (1991), available at http://books. 
google.com/books?id=X1hkTzw41PoC.  
92 Id.; see also Yowell, supra note 90, at 117. 
93 See supra text accompanying notes 52-55. 
94 See supra text accompanying notes 56-57. 
95 See Yosef Babad, Minchas Chinuch, Commandment 78 (Machon Jeru-
salem ed, 1988) (discussing this dilemma and leaving it unresolved); see also 
Dovid Tzvi Zahman, Minchas Soles 287 (Belgoraj ed., 1934). 
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against what he believes to be the truth, the defendant will be 
acquitted due to our anti-unanimity rule.  However, if the jus-
tice votes what he earnestly believes, a vote of “innocent,” the 
defendant will be convicted and executed under a majority de-
cision of twenty-three against one.  A truly strange dilemma! 
Chaim ibn Attar (“Ohr HaChaim”) solves this dilemma by 
understanding the Biblical verse commanding one to “follow 
the majority” as requiring the twenty-third justice to vote “in-
nocent.”
96
  Expounding on the goal of true justice, Chaim ibn 
Attar posits that a judge must not think of larger social policy 
considerations when deciding a case.97  The judge is required to 
vote his belief on the case at hand, never looking at the effect of 
his vote.  This is the meaning of the commandment to follow 
the majority – follow the majority even if you have another way 
to effectuate certain social policies.
98
 
Chaim ibn Attar’s lesson, that every individual case must 
be judged as the “end” to itself and not as a “means” to a larger 
social policy goal, is virtually identical to Dworkin’s legal theo-
ry.  Interestingly, Chaim ibn Attar, like Schneerson and Mor-
genstern, extrapolates such a concept from this fascinating an-
ti-unanimity Talmudic passage.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Unanimous verdicts have long been the subject of much 
scholarly literature.  While a large part of scholarly discussion 
centers on whether a unanimity requirement for verdicts is 
beneficial or detrimental to the legal system, the Talmud has a 
novel approach.  The Talmud’s view that unanimous verdicts 
result in an acquittal is, at first glance, very troubling.  Yet, af-
ter analyzing multiple potential rationales for this confusing 
law, the anti-unanimity of the Talmud sheds light on two im-
portant legal theories.  Highlighting Weber’s “formal rationali-
ty” and Dworkin’s “ends/means” theories, this Talmudic law 
can be very helpful to modern legal philosophers.  Instead of an 
arcane, irrational rule, the anti-unanimity of the Sanhedrin is 
actually a brilliant lesson in legal theory.  
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